Nukes In Syria - Fact: Of course, the program alone will not deter the West; could not produce an effective weapon until 2011. However, knowledge of the existing nuclear program may have further weakened Assad's position in the West, potentially making intervention more attractive.
On September 6, 2007, Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed a mysterious installation near the Euphrates River in the Deir ez-Zor region. The strike provoked surprisingly little response from Damascus. The cyber attack reportedly prevented a defensive Syrian military mobilization and even a diplomatic outcry was quelled. No other Arab government has commented on the attack, and even the Israelis have long denied the operation.
Nukes In Syria
Destroying the facility was not seen as a quick fix in either Israel or the US. Concerns about intelligence strength after the defeat in Iraq stayed the latter's hand, while fear of an international backlash, not to mention a Syrian military response, troubled the former. What if cooler heads prevailed and Israel never took the hit?
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It is difficult to gauge how far Syria would have been from developing nuclear weapons had its efforts gone smoothly. While we may never know the full story of Syria's interest in its nuclear program, it likely stems from the growing gap in conventional capabilities between Syria and Israel, as well as the US invasion of Iraq. Although Syria has always denied that the installation was part of a nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later confirmed that the site appeared to be a nuclear reactor.
There is no doubt that Syria's agenda was primitive compared to that of Iran or North Korea. However, it is entirely possible that Syria could rely on technical assistance from both countries; in fact, it is highly likely that North Korea provided technical assistance for the construction of the Euphrates reactor. However, Damascus will face a number of technical challenges, and there is little indication that Syria's economic infrastructure is up to the challenge of dealing with the very serious industrial problems and difficulties it will face. While Syria's economy is larger than North Korea's, it is more dependent on the extraction of raw materials, making it less able to meet the technical challenges of nuclear trade. Syria also lacks the vast oil wealth that Iran and Iraq enjoyed during their nuclear campaigns.
After the box was destroyed, it became clear that Assad was not so determined to cover the costs required to develop nuclear weapons. Unlike Iraq and Iran, Damascus has made no effort to disperse and strengthen its nuclear facilities. Indeed, given Syria's proximity to Israel, it is hard to imagine how anyone in that country believed the project could go unnoticed. As Anthony Cordesman has argued, a nuclear program would be extremely vulnerable at many stages of its development.
This suggests that the bureaucratic politics of the nuclear program were complex and that Syria may not have gone through its development without even being hit. However, Israel believed that even the remote possibility of a nuclear Syria was worth limiting, and that the attacks would have the added benefit of reinforcing the Begin Doctrine.
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In any case, it is highly unlikely that even an intact Syria would be able to successfully develop a nuclear weapon at the onset of the Arab Spring. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria has placed such a heavy burden on the Assad regime that it is unlikely to continue its nuclear program. Will the nature of the war change if Syria continues to actively seek nuclear weapons? The war developed somewhat in anticipation of Western intervention. Anti-regime forces took risks and made commitments in the hope that the US and Europe would step up their efforts with active military support. The West has offered rhetorical support for Assad's ouster, but only limited and measured military aid to anti-regime forces.
Clearly, the program alone will not deter the West; could not produce an effective weapon until 2011. However, knowledge of the existing nuclear program may have further weakened Assad's position in the West, potentially making intervention more attractive. In addition, the program is likely to achieve some degree of technical success in the production of plutonium, the development of related nuclear technologies, and the training of a cadre of scientists and engineers. That success alone may have unnerved the West—perhaps enough to take a more assertive policy toward the Assad regime.
The question is what impact the war may have had on the knowledge and infrastructure developed around the program, and how the engineers and materials may have ended up in the hands of ISIS or other insurgent groups. ISIS took control of the site in 2014, although the Syrian government is likely to defend it more vigorously if the reactor remains active. ISIS won't be able to build usable weapons, and the US or Syria will likely destroy any facilities before they fall into the group's hands - but it will still be a cause for concern. And while ISIS could not directly use expertise or equipment, it could try to export it with dangerous consequences. In any case, forces friendly to the United States occupied the area in 2017.
The attack on Syria was probably not decisive in stopping Syria from acquiring nuclear weapons; the program was a long way off and would most likely end at the start of the Syrian civil war. However, the attack helped to confirm Israel's regional sense of military power after the failure of its war with Hezbollah and undoubtedly convinced Washington and Tehran that Israel would consider using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This, in turn, affected the negotiating strategies of all parties under the JCPOA, which continues to govern Iran's relations with the international community. The question remains whether that legacy will survive into 2018. An F-16 Fighting Falcon takes off from Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey on August 12, 2015. There are about 50 US nuclear bombs at the base, but the F-16s are unable to deploy them Crystal Ardrey / US Air Force via AP
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Despite years of spiraling relations with Turkey, the United States myopically still has about 50 nuclear bombs in the country. Even now, after Turkey launched a devastating offensive on October 9 against America's Kurdish allies in Syria, disrupting the Pentagon's war on ISIS and reportedly firing on American troops who have not yet withdrawn, they are still there.
Interestingly, according to The New York Times, the State and Energy Departments are currently only reviewing contingency plans to eliminate Turkey's nuclear weapons. While the recent events in Syria represent a new high point in US-Turkey relations, the risks of their containment have long been apparent - especially when their safety was threatened in 2016 during an attempted coup d'état.
They could be taken over by a hostile Turkey or attacked by other entities in an increasingly volatile region.
The weapons in question are B61 tactical nuclear bombs, old-school gravity bombs designed to be dropped by short-range fighter jets on military bases and battlefield concentrations. They are stored in the underground vaults of Turkey's Incirlik Air Base in the southern Turkish city of Adana. As such, they could be taken over by a hostile Turkey or attacked by other entities in an increasingly unstable region. They should be removed as soon as possible.
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The presence of the B61 in Turkey is due to Cold War policies in which the United States transferred nuclear weapons to NATO allies Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. This move demonstrates collective responsibility and solidarity in NATO's nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. It also sent a political message that these countries should not develop their own nuclear weapons. The United States can always provide the air forces of these countries with access to weapons if necessary.
Currently, the US still maintains 150 to 200 B61s in Europe, which can be used by specially modified Tornado and F-16 Falcon fighters. In the future, F-35 stealth fighters will instead be equipped with an improved, manned version of the B61.
But Turkey no longer has any F-16s or pilots certified to carry nuclear weapons. None of the US aircraft stationed at Incirlik are equipped for this task either. So it is highly unlikely that the Incirlik bombs will have a significant impact on ensuring Turkish or American security. After all, as long as Turkey remains in NATO, nuclear weapons located elsewhere in Europe will still be available to deter attacks on Turkey from other countries.
Turkey would have gotten the F-35 had it not been kicked out of the program earlier this year for buying Russian anti-aircraft weapons that violated U.S. sanctions against Moscow and created security vulnerabilities for the same stealth planes. That in itself speaks volumes for the story: an ally was once so close that it was about to get and build parts for it
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